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Abstract 
We report a meta-analysis on the relationship between in-group bias and culture. Our focus is on whether broad 
macro-contextual variables influence the extent to which individuals favour their in-group. Data from 21,266 par-
ticipants from 18 societies included in experimental and survey studies were available. Using Hofstede’s (1980) and 
Schwartz (2006) culture-level predictors in a 3-level mixed-effects meta-analysis, we found strong support for the 
uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. An interaction between Autonomy and real vs artificial groups suggested that in 
low autonomy contexts, individuals show greater in-group bias for real groups. Implications for social identity theory 
and intergroup conflict are outlined.
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Background
In-group bias (the tendency to favour one’s own group 
over other groups) has been one of the most well-sup-
ported psychological findings. The ground-breaking 
research by Tajfel et  al. (1971) demonstrated that in-
group bias can occur when group boundaries are com-
pletely meaningless, such as when using random letters 
or inconsequential artistic preferences. This phenom-
enon has been found to be so robust and stable, that 
researchers even started investigating potential genetic 
components (Lewis and Bates 2010). At the same time, 
both different experimental manipulations and the nature 
of manipulated groups may increase or decrease the in-
group bias (for reviews, see for example Bettencourt et al. 
2001; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Hewstone et  al. 2002; 
Mullen et al. 1992). What has not been addressed previ-
ously is to what extent the larger macro-societal context 
may also have an influence on in-group bias. It is note-
worthy that those structural variables which have been 
extensively discussed within the classic Social Identity 
Theory (SIT, Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986), such as the 
nature of groups and their mutual relationships, are likely 
to vary systematically across different societies (Hofstede 
1980). These more distal cultural variables have remained 
largely unexplored in research on in-group bias. Our 
question returns to the early writings by Tajfel who 
explicitly stated that group processes need to be under-
stood within the context in which they are occurring and 
can not be assumed to be ‘universal’ (Tajfel et  al. 1971, 
page 151).
In this study we focus on the effect of societal culture as 
one potential variable at a distal level affecting in-group 
bias both under minimal group conditions and in real-
world contexts. Examining this question will allow us (a) 
to shed light on the boundary conditions of SIT, as well 
as (b) outline some potential mechanisms that drive in-
group bias in both experimental and real-life situations. 
SIT is the dominant theory examining how individuals 
are linked to groups in intergroup contexts within soci-
eties. A different paradigm focusing on individual-group 
relationships has been individualism-collectivism, focus-
ing on the salience of individual-group relations across 
societies (e.g., Smith and Bond 1998; Smith et  al. 2013; 
Triandis 1995). A number of authors have noted cultural 
differences (Wetherell 1982; Yamagishi et  al. 1998) and 
discussed whether social identity processes are more (or 
less) applicable in collectivist compared to individualistic 
societies (e.g., Brown et al. 1992; Hinkle and Brown 1990; 
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Yamagishi et  al. 1998). We address this issue directly. 
Regarding the second question, the mechanisms under-
lying social identity theory have been challenged (e.g., 
Hogg and Abrams 1990, 1988). A desire to increase self-
esteem has been long argued to underlie intergroup dis-
crimination (for a critical examination, see Aberson et al. 
2000). A plausible alternative mechanism is uncertainty 
reduction (Hogg 2007). Previous experimental research 
has focused on task uncertainty, while recognizing that 
contextual uncertainty also may play a role. Here, we 
examine macro-contextual variables linked to uncer-
tainty at the societal level. Therefore, cross-cultural work 
can help to examine plausible theoretical mechanisms 
that drive minimal group effects.
In summary, the aim of the study is to examine the 
strength of in-group bias in both experimental and real-
word contexts and to link it to cultural differences in 
societal values. Therefore, we explore how distal macro-
contextual (societal) effects, independent of specific 
structural intergroup variables (permeability, stability, 
legitimacy) within societies, influence overall in-group 
bias, which will allow for a greater contextualization and 
positioning of social identity in a globalized world.
In‑group bias
In-group bias is the positive evaluation of the in-group 
compared to the out-group (Brewer 1979). This evalua-
tion can be accompanied by a preferential allocation of 
resources to in-group members, competition with out-
group members and collaboration with in-group mem-
bers or other perceptual, affective or behavioural effects 
that positively discriminate the in-group from the out-
group, a condition that is often linked to ethnocentrism 
(Brewer 1979; Mullen et al. 1992). Tajfel and his students 
(Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et  al. 1971) demonstrated that such 
in-group biases can be produced by a mere classifica-
tion of individuals into random groups. This so-called 
‘minimal group’ paradigm required that (a) individuals 
have no face-to-face contact, (b) group membership is 
completely anonymous, (c) there is no instrumental or 
rational link between the categorization and the experi-
mental tasks to be completed by participants, and (d) the 
responses by participants have real implications for the 
groups, but not the responding individual (Tajfel et  al. 
1971, pp. 153–154). This experimental paradigm was an 
important element in the emergence of social identity 
theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). Individuals are 
thought to strive for positive social identities to main-
tain positive self-esteem. This striving for self-enhance-
ment is best achieved by intergroup social comparisons 
in which the in-group is positively differentiated from 
an out-group. The exact nature and process of social 
comparison depends on the relations between the 
groups and their perceived relative status, stability, legit-
imacy and permeability (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This 
direct link of the in-group bias to self-esteem motives 
has been debated and the current evidence is suggesting 
a more complex relationship (Aberson et al. 2000; Hogg 
and Abrams 1988).
Hogg (2000, 2007) developed uncertainty-identity 
theory as an extension of SIT. Hogg focused on the 
motivational processes underlying group identification 
and argued that self-uncertainty is a primary motive for 
identification with groups. To feel uncertain is an aver-
sive psychological state and most people are motivated to 
reduce this sense of uncertainty. Put simply, by identify-
ing with a social group, people derive a sense of meaning 
and belonging. This subjective group membership in turn 
provides prescriptive norms and guidelines for appropri-
ate behaviour (“this is what we do”) that help individuals 
to navigate an uncertain world. The uncertainty reduc-
tion mechanism has been supported in a number of 
experiments, mainly focusing on task uncertainty (Grieve 
and Hogg 1999; Mullin and Hogg 1999).
Despite debate around the relevant process mechanism 
leading to in-group bias, the relative effect of in-group 
bias itself was found to be highly stable and robust. A 
number of meta-analyses have summarized the empirical 
research to date and have demonstrated that the effect is 
replicable and consistent (Bettencourt et  al. 2001; Buhl 
1999; Mullen et al. 1992) and it has been accepted as an 
important theoretical process in explaining intergroup 
relations (Hewstone et al. 2002).
Uncertainty avoidance and in‑group bias
As discussed above, uncertainty has been suggested to 
play a major role in explaining intergroup discrimination. 
Hogg (2000, 2007) distinguished two types of sources of 
uncertainty: uncertainty arising from the immediate task 
and uncertainty inherent in the larger social context. 
Larger context variation in uncertainty has not received 
much attention in the social identity literature, but there 
is systematic variability in the management of uncer-
tainty across modern societies. Hofstede’s (1980) semi-
nal study of culture defined uncertainty avoidance as the 
extent to which individuals within societies are social-
ized to avoid uncertain situations by establishing formal 
rules and structures. Higher uncertainty avoidance is a 
situational concern with reducing uncertainty, which can 
be predicted to increase in-group bias. We therefore test 
to what extent this society level concern with avoiding 
uncertainty is related to in-group bias. Greater uncer-
tainty avoidance should be associated with greater in-
group bias (Hypothesis 1).
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Individualism‑collectivism and in‑group bias
Individualism-collectivism (Hofstede 1980; Triandis 
1995) has emerged as a major dimension in cultural 
research that differentiates contexts in which individuals 
are thought to be self-reliant, autonomous, independent, 
driven by their own attitudes, beliefs and convictions and 
endorsing a rational attitude towards group membership, 
with cultural contexts that socialize individuals to be 
interdependent, to rely on one’s duties, norms and mor-
als dictated by the group in deciding on actions and to 
form strong emotional and affective bonds with groups. 
The former is more typical of Western Europe and North 
American societies, where the latter is a typical socializa-
tion pattern in much of Asia, Africa, Eastern and South-
ern Europe and South America.
Associations between individualism-collectivism and 
in-group bias in both directions have been observed, 
potentially driven by different mechanisms. First, col-
lectivism might be associated with higher in-group bias. 
Hinkle and Brown (1990) suggested that social identity 
processes are more likely to take place in collectivistic 
kind of groups, because collectivistic groups or indi-
viduals are more likely to worry about in-group identi-
fication. A slightly different argument was provided by 
Hogg (2007). As discussed above, uncertainty reduction 
is one potential driver for intergroup discrimination. 
Therefore, greater uncertainty avoidance should lead to 
stronger in-group association, which in turn leads to an 
empirical merging of uncertainty avoidant and collectiv-
ist behavioural pattern. As a consequence, empirically 
it will be difficult to separate in-group attachment and 
uncertainty mechanisms because the two dimensions are 
intrinsically linked. In line with these arguments, uncer-
tainty avoidance and collectivism are highly correlated in 
Hofstede’s data set (see Hogg 2007) or did not emerge as 
separate dimensions in other cultural frameworks such 
as Schwartz’ (1994). These arguments are also consistent 
with the strategic equilibrium dilemma noted by Yamagi-
shi et al. (1998), who predicted that in closed-knit groups, 
people practice in-group favouritism because it gives 
them a competitive advantage and reduces uncertainty.
In contrast to these positive associations of in-group 
bias with collectivism, opposing relationships may also 
be plausible. Hogg (2000, 2007) observed that stable 
identities in a pre-modern society have been replaced by 
an atomistic individual-oriented society, which is accom-
panied by an erosion of traditional community links and 
stable collective identification targets. This lose connec-
tion of the self to various possible groups then leads to a 
greater concern with group identities as well as a height-
ened need to establish and maintain links to in-groups. In 
more collectivistic settings, people do not need to worry 
about their identities or level of inclusion in the group 
since individual-group links are stable and not negotiable. 
People have typically little choice to stay or leave a group 
and fewer in-groups pervade more aspects of everyday 
life compared to more individualistic societies, where 
multiple potential in-groups are available, but temporally 
and geographically separated. This so-called ‘postmodern 
paradox’ therefore leads to individuals in highly individu-
alistic societies to yearn for collective affiliations. The evi-
dence supporting either of the two mechanisms is mixed 
(e.g., Brown et al. 1992; Capozza et al. 2000).
However, these two hypotheses may not be conflict-
ing with each other. Yamagishi et  al. (1998) suggested 
that collectivism is more strongly related to in-group 
favouritism because it provides in-groups with a strategic 
advantage (see also Hinkle and Brown 1990). In contrast, 
Hogg (2000) speculated that the ‘postmodern paradox’ 
increased the need of citizens in individualistic societies 
to identify with various possible in-groups. The minimal 
group paradigm uses arbitrary group distinctions, to the 
extent that people in individualistic societies ‘crave’ iden-
tification, we could expect a stronger bias towards these 
arbitrary groups. In contrast, in collectivist societies 
with more stable group membership there is less need 
for people to identify with novel groups, but in contrast 
it is identification with real groups that is most impor-
tant for collectivists. Individuals have been socialized to 
feel emotionally attached and strongly connected to their 
in-groups, hence, in-group bias could be expected to be 
larger for real groups compared to randomly created 
groups in experimental settings that are likely to have lit-
tle affective value for people in collectivist settings. This 
integration suggests an interaction hypothesis (Hypoth-
esis 2): in-group bias is strongest in collectivistic contexts 
when focusing on real-groups and weakest in collectivis-
tic settings when focusing on artificial groups. In-group 
might be intermediate in individualistic contexts with 
both real and artificial groups.
Societal value dimensions
We have identified two major dimensions along which 
societies differ that might be related to in-group bias. 
The societal variables of interest are related to individ-
ual-group relations (e.g., individualism-collectivism), 
and the extent to which uncertainty is tolerated or not 
(e.g., uncertainty avoidance). We examine the effect of 
variables derived from two different value frameworks 
(Hofstede 1980; Schwartz 1994, 2006). These dimensions 
were derived from large scale studies in which individuals 
answered batteries of questions about their behaviours, 
attitudes, beliefs and values. The corresponding scores 
therefore reflect modal tendencies of attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviours of groups of individuals within a soci-
ety. Individuals in all societies have options concerning 
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their beliefs and behaviours and can engage in particular 
behaviours if the context allows it. Societal level dimen-
sions of culture indicate that certain attitudes, beliefs or 
behaviours are more frequent in some societies compared 
to other societies, therefore reflecting overall behavioural 
tendencies of groups of individuals within a society.
In this study, we ask to what extent such tendencies are 
related to in-group bias. The classic cultural framework 
was developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001). He sampled 
employees in IBM and originally described four major 
dimensions. The dimensions of interest for us are indi-
vidualism-collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. This 
framework has been extensively studied and is the most 
widely used dimensional framework of societal culture 
(Taras et al. 2010).
Schwartz (1994) developed an alternative framework 
that shows some overlap, but also deviates in important 
aspects. Based on ratings from teachers and students, he 
distinguished autonomy (subdivided into intellectual and 
affective components) from embeddedness (originally con-
servatism). This dimension is similar to individualism-col-
lectivism, but emphasises more being embedded in social 
groups and deriving meaning and identity from belonging 
to inclusive and strong in-groups compared to the oppos-
ing end where individuals are seen as autonomous in their 
thoughts and actions and are freer to act in line with their 
self-interests. Schwartz (1994) argues that his autonomy 
versus embeddedness dimension is closer to the original 
ideal of individualism-collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1995). 
Having separate dimensions for the opposing ends of this 
assumed underlying dimension (see Fischer et  al. 2009) 
allows us to separate the differential effects of individual-
ism (autonomy) versus collectivism (embeddedness).
Schwartz (1994) did not identify a separate soci-
etal dimension of uncertainty avoidance. However, the 
notions of security values (Schwartz 1992) which are a 
central element of embeddedness values reflect a concern 
with avoiding insecurity and risks, and maintaining sta-
bility and order in one’s surroundings. As noted above, 
uncertainty and collectivism are potentially strongly 
intertwined and might be difficult to separate empirically 
(see Smith et al. 2006).
In summary, Hofstede and Schwartz provide alter-
native frameworks for measuring individualism-col-
lectivism. Only Hofstede provides separate scores for 
uncertainty avoidance. For the sake of consistency, we 
continue using the Hofstede labels, unless specifically 
referring to Schwartz’ dimensions.
The current study
In this study we explore societal effects on in-group bias. 
To derive a measure of in-group bias, we conducted a 
meta-analysis of experimental and correlational studies 
that reported an index of in-group bias. We were not 
interested in more subtle variations in the effect (e.g., 
Bettencourt et al. 2001), but were interested in whether 
the overall level of in-group bias across conditions or 
group targets is influenced by more distal macro-con-
textual variables, independent of the structural relations 
between the groups within a society. Given the non-
specific and broad nature of culture-level dimensions, 
by not paying attention to finer experimental distinc-
tions or subtleties our approach provides a more con-
servative estimate of the influence of societal context 
on this psychological phenomenon. This is also based 
on pragmatic reasons as it allows us to pool a larger set 
of studies by focusing on more inclusive criteria. Unfor-
tunately, to date there are not enough studies available 
across all the societies included in our study that would 
allow finer coding of structural variables within each 
society.
Methods
Literature search and effect size coding
We conducted a PsycINFO and Web of Science electronic 
data base search in November 2009 using the key words 
‘minimal group’ and ‘ingroup/in-group bias’. We also con-
sulted the reference lists of published meta-analyses on 
in-group bias and minimal group studies (Aberson et al. 
2000; Mullen et al. 1992, Robbins and Krueger 2005). A 
total of 498 articles with these key words were found. In 
addition to these published articles, a total of 20 unpub-
lished articles or doctoral theses were directly obtained 
from authors via email (to the best of our knowledge 
these studies are still unpublished at the time of writing). 
The search strategy was focused on maximizing stud-
ies that were not conducted in the UK or USA (as most 
research had been conducted there).
The inclusion criteria for the studies were the follow-
ing. First, the study needed to have been conducted 
using a version of the minimal group paradigm or have 
included some measure of in-group bias (rating, recog-
nition or allocation tasks). Second, the national back-
ground of participants should have been stated explicitly. 
We did not include migrant samples (e.g., Polynesians 
in NZ, Wetherell 1982) in our study, but minorities that 
were resident in a country were included. Third, suffi-
cient information to compute an effect size for in-group 
bias should have been available.
We coded additional parameters. We are interested 
in overall in-group bias, yet status differences are the 
most consistent predictor of variability in in-group bias 
(Bettencourt et al. 2001; Buhl 1999; Mullen et al. 1992). If 
possible, we coded one overall estimate of in-group bias 
across all other conditions. If not, we coded status of the 
groups (−1 lower status, 0 equal status, 1 higher status) 
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in line with Mullen et al. (1992) and Buhl (1999). Over-
all in-group bias collapsed across status was coded as 
equal status. If other conditions were included that were 
intended to experimentally decrease or eliminate in-
group bias (e.g., uncertainty reduction, Grieve and Hogg 
1999), we did not include those conditions in our coding. 
If there were multiple dependent variables, we averaged 
them per sample. In essence, our coding focused on over-
all estimates of in-group bias, averaging over variations 
in status, group size and type of dependent variable. If 
authors reported both in-group bias and out-group dero-
gation, only in-group bias was coded. There was not suffi-
cient information across studies conducted in the various 
societies to consistently differentiate in-group favourit-
ism from out-group derogation (e.g., Bettencourt et  al. 
2001) or any finer differentiation of socio-structural vari-
ables as discussed in SIT research.
In-group bias was coded in the direction that greater 
emphasis was given to an in-group (vs an out-group). 
Therefore, a positive effect size shows a bias towards the 
in-group in ratings, allocations of points or money or 
recognition of group members. A negative sign indicates 
a bias towards the out-group. All effect sizes were con-
verted to correlation coefficients (Rosenthal 1991) and 
then r-to-z transformed. The inverse variance weight was 
based on the sample size (n − 3).
The final data set contained 269 samples from 121 
articles based on a total N of 21,266 participants from 
18 societies. See Table  1 for the average in-group bias 
by society together with standard errors, confidence 
intervals and number of samples. The list of studies and 
coded information is available from the first author.
Country level indicators
We used country-means for uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism reported by Hofstede (1980, 2001). We 
used the averaged teacher and student scores for auton-
omy versus embeddedness from Schwartz (1994). Data 
for all 18 countries were available. The validity of these 
indicators is extensively discussed in Hofstede (2001) and 
Schwartz (1994, 2006).
Meta‑analytical strategy
Meta-analysis is a set of techniques that statistically 
combines the results of two or more independent stud-
ies to provide an overall answer to a question of interest 
(Everitt and Wykes 1999). In our analysis we are using a 
multi-level mixed effect model. Most meta-analyses use a 
fixed effects model (Field 2003; Lipsey and Wilson 2001). 
Effect sizes are seen as direct replications of each other 
and it is assumed that samples come from the same pop-
ulation (only subject-level sampling error is estimated). 
Although convenient, this assumption is not justified in 
most cases (Field 2003). A random model in contrast pre-
supposes that studies are randomly drawn from a larger 
population of studies. Therefore, both subject-level sam-
pling error and variability between samples are consid-
ered (van den Noortgate and Onghena 2001; Lipsey and 
Wilson 2001). Random effects models provide more ade-
quate representations of most meta-analytical data sets 
Table 1 Mean in‑group bias per country, standard errors, 95 % confidence intervals and number of samples
Mean in‑group bias Standard error −95 % confidence interval +95 % confidence interval Number of samples
Australia 0.51 0.11 0.29 0.73 7
Belgium 0.57 0.18 0.22 0.92 3
Canada 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.42 10
Finland 0.66 0.17 0.33 0.98 3
Germany 0.37 0.05 0.27 0.47 45
Israel 0.31 0.13 0.05 0.58 5
Italy 0.61 0.11 0.38 0.83 7
Japan 0.31 0.27 −0.23 0.84 2
South Korea 0.45 0.15 0.14 0.75 4
Mexico 0.28 0.19 −0.09 0.64 3
Netherlands 0.39 0.09 0.21 0.56 11
New Zealand 0.45 0.10 0.25 0.65 8
Portugal 0.99 0.25 0.51 1.48 2
South Africa 0.27 0.22 −0.16 0.70 2
Spain 0.55 0.31 −0.06 1.15 1
Sweden 0.22 0.21 −0.19 0.62 2
UK 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.30 80
USA 0.46 0.04 0.39 0.53 74
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(Konstantopoulos and Hedges 2004). Mixed effect mod-
els use a combination of both approaches, as they esti-
mate both subject-level and study-level variation in effect 
sizes, but then allow testing of whether study variability 
is systematic and explicable by specific context variables 
beyond random variation (see further discussions in Field 
2003; Hox and de Leeuw 2003; Konstantopoulos and 
Hedges 2004; van den Noortgate and Onghena 2001).
A significant advantage of mixed effects models is that 
findings can be generalized beyond the specific samples 
included in the meta-analysis. The assumption is that 
studies are assumed to be random samples from a larger 
population of studies. Therefore, the results can be gen-
eralized to other studies not yet conducted or to stud-
ies that were not included in the meta-analyses. Taking 
into account sampling of studies makes the results more 
conservative.
Multilevel approach
Since we have studies nested in countries, this nest-
ing needs to be considered. Therefore, we developed a 
3-level structure to account for dependencies with coun-
tries, where effect sizes are level 1, study characteristics 
are level 2 and country is level 3 (see Fischer and Mansell 
2009 for a discussion of this approach). This set-up also 
allows us to control for a number of potentially important 
confounding variables. We first entered the publication 
year, status of groups and whether groups were artifi-
cial or real. We then controlled for any significant effect 
before entering the variables of interest at level 3 (society 
level). The effects of interest are (a) the effects of society 
level variables at level 3 on the intercepts at level 1 (main 
effects of context variables) and (b) the effects of coun-
try level variables at level 3 on the effects of level 2 (study 
characteristics) on the intercepts at level 1 (interaction 
between group type with country-level characteristics 
on in-group bias). Given the relatively small number of 
samples, we entered each predictor variable individually 
and then ran a final robustness test where all significant 
predictors were entered together.
Results
The overall in-group bias using a random effects method 
in our sample was 0.369, standard error 0.021, with 
the 95  % confidence intervals stretching from 0.327 
to 0.410. This bias was highly significant: z  =  17.37, 
p  <  0.0001. There was significant variation in effect 
sizes: Q (268) = 2224.06, p < 0.0001. Societal differences 
accounted for 8.75 % of the variability. This is compara-
ble to other cultural differences in psychological variables 
(Fischer and Schwartz 2011).
We first estimated the effects of sample characteristics 
at level 2. Entering the publication year as a group-mean 
centred variable and both group status and group type as 
unstandardized predictors, the effects for year (γ = 0.003, 
trobust  =  0.99, p  =  0.34) and group type (γ  =  0.080, 
trobust =  1.43, p =  0.17) were not significant. The effect 
for group status was significant (γ = 0.051, trobust = 3.46, 
p =  0.003). Higher status groups show higher in-group 
bias. Removing year from the equation, status remained 
significant (γ = 0.050, trobust = 4.54, p = 0.001) and type 
became marginally significant (γ =  0.096, trobust =  1.92, 
p = 0.07). Real groups showed higher in-group bias. The 
two study variables together accounted for about 71.39 % 
of the variance in in-group bias across societies. The vari-
ance component for group type was marginally signifi-
cant (χ2 [5] = 9.66, p = 0.08), but there was no significant 
variability in the effect for status: χ2 [5] = 1.28, p > 0.50.
Hofstede
Supporting hypothesis 1, greater uncertainty avoid-
ance was associated with more in-group bias: γ = 0.004, 
trobust = 3.12, p = 0.007. The interaction with real vs arti-
ficial groups was not significant: γ = 0.001, trobust = 0.00, 
p > 0.50. Uncertainty avoidance explained 79.02 % of the 
remaining variance between societies, after accounting 
for study effects at level 2.
Testing the effect of individualism, the main effect was 
not significant: γ  =  −0.001, trobust  =  −1.38, p  =  0.19. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported, because the interaction 
effect between individualism and group type (real vs arti-
ficial) was not significant (but in the predicted direction): 
γ = −0.004, trobust = −0.99, p = 0.34.
Schwartz values
Examining the effects of autonomy, the main effect was 
not significant: γ  =  −0.054, trobust  =  −0.69, p  >  0.50. 
Hypothesis 2 was supported because the interaction 
between group type and autonomy was significant: 
γ  =  −0.45, trobust  =  −3.34, p  =  0.004. Figure  1 shows 
the relationship. In line with hypothesis 2, in-group bias 
is stronger for real groups in less autonomous contexts 
compared to more autonomous contexts. Autonomy 
explained 87.95 % of the variability in differential effect of 
group type on in-group across societies.
Examining the effect of embeddedness, the main 
effect was not significant: γ  =  −0.019, trobust  =  −0.32, 
p > 0.50. The interaction was not significant: γ = 0.262, 
trobust =  1.50, p =  0.15. Although hypothesis 2 was not 
supported, the direction of the effect was in the expected 
direction and explained 45.65 % of the variability across 
societies.
Robustness analysis
To test the robustness of all the findings, we entered all 
the significant effects in a single model (uncertainty 
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avoidance, autonomy on in-group bias, interactions 
between group type and autonomy). Uncertainty avoid-
ance remained significant: γ  =  0.004, trobust  =  2.98, 
p  =  0.009. Autonomy was not significant as before: 
γ = −0.053, trobust = −0.083, p =  0.42. The interaction 
between type of group and autonomy remained signifi-
cant: γ = −0.515, trobust = −4.05, p = 0.001, but the inter-
action with uncertainty was not significant (as before): 
γ = 0.001, trobust = 0.32, p > 0.50.
Discussion
We examined in-group bias across 18 societies. The over-
all effect was significant and of similar moderate magni-
tude as in previous meta-analyses (e.g., Bettencourt et al. 
2001; Mullen et al. 1992). This suggests that in-group bias 
is a relatively universal phenomenon. At the same time, 
the magnitude of the effect varied systematically across 
societies. In more uncertainty avoidant contexts, in-
group bias increased. This finding supports uncertainty-
avoidance theory (Hogg 2000). Identification with groups 
allows for reduction in uncertainty through allowing 
individuals to find a sense of who they are, and what to 
expect of those in and outside of one’s group (but see Fis-
cher 2013).
Our analysis was also able to shed some light on the 
previously encountered inconsistent results in relation 
to individualism-collectivism related dimensions. Indi-
vidualism-Collectivism is related to in-group bias only 
under specific conditions. It appears that individuals in 
less autonomous (less individualistic and more collectiv-
istic) societies exhibit more in-group bias if the targets 
are real-life groups. In contexts where individuals are 
not strongly embedded in naturally occurring groups, a 
longing for identification may lead to greater bias favour-
ing novel groups. However, in contexts where individu-
als are strongly embedded in their groups, in-group bias 
may become stronger if the focus is on those groups with 
which individuals identify. Therefore, the stronger iden-
tification with their in-groups will be expressed in in-
group bias for those groups they feel strongly identified 
with, especially if the intergroup context is made salient 
and refers to relevant groups (Brown 2000).
Our results have a number of theoretical and practical 
implications. First, the findings suggest that intergroup 
conditions have a significant likelihood to deteriorate 
in high uncertainty salient contexts. Although plausi-
ble, this issue has not received much attention. To date, 
theoretical and empirical work has emphasized the 
effects of threat (Stephan and Stephan 2000). The closely 
related affective state of uncertainty is likely to show 
similar effects on intergroup relations. Our results cer-
tainly demonstrate that a societal concern with uncer-
tainty avoidance increase the likelihood to favour the 
in-group over the out-group. These biases can have sig-
nificant real-world implications if we convert it into 
money, jobs, access to basic resources or health, educa-
tion, and social services. The overall levels of uncertainty 
and the general social climate can potentially have a large 
impact on intergroup relations. For example, increases 
in unemployment as one potential antecedent of experi-
enced uncertainty has been shown to be associated with 
increased prejudice against Muslims in Europe (Strabac 
and Listhaug 2008). Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) found that 
when levels of unemployment increased, dominance 
beliefs were more strongly related to anti-immigrant atti-
tudes. These findings suggest that additional to specific 
structural variables of the groups as typically studied in 
SIT research (legitimacy, permeability, stability), there 
are larger macro-contextual processes that influence all 
groups and potentially acerbate intergroup processes. We 
could not directly test such interaction effects, but it is 
plausible that general society-wide processes such as lev-
els of uncertainty (or individual-group relations or hier-
archy beliefs) have an impact on the specific structural 
variables tested in SIT research. Therefore, the interac-
tions between legitimacy, permeability and group sta-
tus may be weakened or strengthened depending on the 
larger societal context.
Second, we demonstrated one instance of how gen-
eral psychological theories can be tested and extended 
through cross-cultural analyses. Treating the world as a 
natural laboratory, researchers can identify macro-level 
variables with systematic variation around the world 
that are theoretically meaningful. Using these variables, 
effects identified in rigorous laboratory experiments 
with high internal validity can be tested for their external 
validity. Such naturalistic quasi-experimental studies can 
also highlight areas for further research if some unex-
pected patterns emerge.
Fig. 1 Interaction between autonomy and group target
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Third, the findings suggest that broad contextual vari-
ables influence responses of individuals in specific exper-
imental settings. One question that arises is whether 
individuals are higher in uncertainty avoidance them-
selves or whether the general social climate has an effect. 
Hogg (2000, 2007) speculated that individual differences 
may have some facilitating influence. Experimental work 
(e.g., Grieve and Hogg 1999) has focused on task uncer-
tainty. It would be interesting to tease apart the indi-
vidual difference (socialization) component from both 
task demands and the overall social climate. One option 
would be to cross task demands and generalized uncer-
tainty (e.g., through priming; see Van den Bos 2001) to 
examine the unique impact of either variable on identifi-
cation processes.
Limitations
We reported a meta-analysis of in-group bias. One limi-
tation is that the available information was scarce. Often 
researchers did not report sufficient information to allow 
calculation of overall in-group effect sizes. Contacting 
authors to obtain information was not a very successful 
strategy since we only received 5 responses with only 2 
of these being able to provide the information needed. 
Authors should be more conscientious about reporting 
experimental details and results.
Because of this lack of information, we averaged across 
experimental conditions and dependent variables. This 
results in a rather crude and unspecific measure of in-
group bias. Our measure is similar in overall magnitude 
to previous meta-analyses, so this is re-assuring. How-
ever, we might have missed subtle effects (interactions 
between study characteristics and country-level char-
acteristics). As desirable as this may be, the information 
from studies available from these studies did not allow 
finer coding without losing too much information. Spe-
cifically, a separation of in-group bias into in-group 
favouritism and out-group derogation would be informa-
tive. However, too few studies have used designs that 
allow the separation of these effects.
The inclusion of SIT variables such as permeability, sta-
bility and legitimacy are also desirable. It can be specu-
lated that society-level processes interact with these 
structural group-level variables and differentially affect 
in-group bias. This is an important avenue for further 
research. In short, we had to make trade-offs between 
maximizing samples from as many countries as possible 
while not coding all experimental characteristics or pay-
ing closer attention to experimental designs and discard-
ing much information from less often studied contexts. 
The fact that we found significant results in line with the-
oretical predictions is evidence of the robustness of the 
overall effects. Future meta-analysis with more primary 
studies could examine some of these interesting experi-
mental variations.
Conclusion
We reported a meta-analysis on in-group bias across 18 
societies. One of our overall strengths was using a 3-level 
mixed effects meta-analysis procedure. This allows us to 
generalize our findings to other studies not included in 
our data base. We found a robust and consistent effect of 
uncertainty avoidance in line with uncertainty-identity 
theory. Greater concern at the societal level with uncer-
tainty was associated with greater in-group bias. This has 
significant implications for the understanding and inter-
vention in intergroup conflicts. Conflicts are more likely 
to escalate in contexts where uncertainty is salient. One 
potential intervention strategy could be to address gen-
eral levels of uncertainty in a society.
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